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Developmental researchers have frequently theorized 
about and investigated the possible cognitive antecedents 
of prosocial behaviors. One such antecedent is perspective 
taking, the ability or tendency to differentiate another’s view 
from one’s own. Measures of perspective taking have assessed 
the individual’s evaluation of the perceptual, cognitive, and 
affective cues that differentiate between others and self as 
well as the tendency or ability to shift or achieve balance 
between those cues (Shantz, 1975). Thus, perspective taking 
has been conceptualized as a global skill, so that, in general, 
higher levels of perspective taking have been expected to be 
associated with prosocial behavior.
Despite these theoretically based expectations, the 
observed empirical relations between perspective taking 
and prosocial behaviors have been relatively inconsistent 
(Eisenberg, 1986; Iannotti, 1985; Kurdek, 1978; Underwood 
& Moore, 1982), even though a signifi cant low positive 
association has been demonstrated using meta-analytic 
procedures (Underwood & Moore, 1982). The only empirical 
investigations that have examined the cause of these 
inconsistencies (Denham, 1986; Iannotti, 1985) involved a 
battery-of-measures approach. For example, Denham (1986) 
found a positive relation between an aggregate measure of 
helping and an aggregate measure of affective perspective 
taking, whereas Iannotti (1985) found a positive relation 
between an aggregate prosocial behavior measure and an 
affective perspective-taking measure. Thus, on the basis of 
these fi ndings, these researchers concluded that affective 
perspective taking is a precursor to helping behaviors.
Another potential explanation for the inconsistent fi ndings 
is that perspective-taking measures sometimes may not have 
tapped cognitive abilities relevant to the prosocial behavior 
being assessed. If this were true, the pattern of relations 
across studies would be expected to vary as a function of the 
relevance of the perspective-taking measure used.
This investigation is based on the proposition that 
there are different types of sociocognitive skills and that a 
measure of a specifi c sociocognitive skill will be consistently 
related to a prosocial behavior only if that behavior requires 
that specifi c type of social cognition. Thus, attributions 
and reasoning about others’ emotions would be expected 
to result in prosocial behavior only to the extent that the 
behavior in question would be expected to be facilitated by 
an understanding of the relevant affective cues or process 
(Eisenberg, 1986). For example, attributions about another’s 
affective state may be associated with helping in a situation 
that requires processing of affective cues, such as when a 
needy other looks sad or is in distress. Similarly reasoning 
about inconsistent cues related to affect (e.g., contradictory 
facial and situational cues) may be associated with helping in 
situations that require reconciling such inconsistencies, such 
as when a needy other does not display sad facial affect. In 
contrast, cognitive perspective-taking measures that require 
an awareness that another’s knowledge may differ from one’s 
own (e.g., Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968, cartoon 
story task) may not be associated with helping in situations 
involving overt affective cues because these measures do not 
require coordinating affective cues.
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Recently, researchers have begun to focus on subtle 
differences in the cognitive demands of various social cognition 
measures (e.g., Gnepp, 1983; Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989; 
Saarni, 1979). Using picture-story measures in which sad or 
happy facial and situational cues are depicted, investigators 
have examined young children’s abilities to identify affective 
cues and to reconcile confl icting affective cues. These 
investigators have found that young children preferentially 
attend to facial cues, that there is increasing attention to 
situational cues with age, and that the accuracy of report of 
both positively and negatively valenced cues increases with 
age (e.g., Iannotti, 1978; Kurdek & Rogdon, 1975; Shantz, 
1975). There is also evidence that young children can attend 
to both facial and situational affective cues and that this ability 
and the ability to reconcile incongruent cues increases with 
age (e.g., Gnepp, 1983; Gnepp, McKee, & Domanic, 1987; 
Reichenbach & Masters, 1983; Saarni, 1979).
The ability to infer others’ emotional states has 
traditionally been considered to be a prerequisite to empathy 
as well as a facilitator of some types of prosocial responding, 
such as altruism (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1984; 
Shantz, 1975). However, in a situation in which the cues 
indicating a need for help are vague or apparently confl icting 
(e.g., when one is not sure whether someone wants or needs 
help, perhaps because of an incongruence between the 
situation and the other’s facial expression), children may help 
only if they are capable of reconciling the incongruent cues. 
In contrast, in a situation in which the facial and situational 
cues are congruent and salient, children’s helping may vary 
as a function of their ability to accurately interpret another’s 
sad cues. Furthermore, individual and group differences in 
attributions and reasoning about others’ affective states could 
account for individual and group differences in helping 
when such behavior specifi cally requires a specifi c type of 
attribution or reasoning about others’ affects.
The measures of social cognition and prosocial behavior 
used in this study were selected so that the type of social 
cognition assessed matched the sociocognitive processing 
required by the prosocial behavior in which children could 
engage (Eisenberg, 1986; Kurdek, 1978). Attributions of 
sadness in situations with congruent sad facial and sad 
situational cues were expected to be positively related to 
helping in a similar context. Similarly, reconciliations about 
affect in a context in which the facial and situational cues 
were incongruent or confl icting (i.e., one type of cue was 
positive, whereas the other was negative) were expected 
to be associated with helping in a similar context. Finally, 
children’s responses to a cognitive perspective-taking task 
that did not focus on the processing of facial and situational 
affective cues were not expected to be signifi cantly correlated 
with helping in the above-mentioned contexts.
Method
Subjects
Participants were 89 preschool through second grade children 
(mean age = 81.1 months, SD = 16.7). Because social cognition 
skills are believed to undergo a qualitative transformation around 
seven years of age (Shantz, 1975) and to ease interpretation of the 
results, children were grouped into two age groups: up to 7 years of 
age and 7 years of age or older. Mean ages of the older and young 
groups were 96.4 and 68.7 months, respectively. There were 20 
older boys, 20 older girls, 30 young boys, and 19 young girls. The 
participants attended a child study laboratory/day-care center or one 
of two elementary schools in a middle-class community in the same 
general area as the day care center.
Apparatus and Materials 
The experimental room contained a color monitor on a table, 
two chairs facing the table, and a one-way mirror; under the mirror 
was a crank handle attached to a box on the wall. The child was 
videotaped through the one-way mirror during the administration of 
the social cognition tasks and during the helping task.
Affective attribution and reasoning task. The affective 
attribution and reasoning task (adapted slightly from Iannotti, 1978) 
consisted of 12 randomly ordered black and white photographs 
mounted on paper (the sex of the child in the picture was matched 
to the sex of the participant) and corresponding stories. There were 
six congruent stories (two sad, two happy, one angry, and one afraid) 
in which the facial expression and the situational cues in the story 
were consistent (e.g., both cues were sad or both cues were happy). 
In addition, there were six incongruent stories (four that included 
mixed sad and happy cues and two that included mixed angry and 
afraid cues) in which the facial expression and the situational cues 
were confl icting (e.g., there were two stories with a happy face in a 
sad situation and two stories with a sad face in a happy situation).
A choice sheet (one set for each sex) displaying line drawings 
of eight facial expressions was used to assess affective attributions. 
There were four pairs of faces randomly ordered on the sheet. The 
paired faces portrayed happy-very happy, sad-very sad, angry-very 
angry, and afraid-very afraid affective expressions. In addition, there 
was one neutral facial expression (labeled “nothing at all”). Before 
presenting the stories and after each story, the experimenter pointed 
to each of the faces on the choice sheet and labeled each one. After 
the third example, the experimenter discontinued labeling if it was 
clear that the child understood the faces.
For each story, the picture depicting the events in the short story 
was covered with a sheet of paper as the experimenter read the story. 
The picture was revealed at a prompt (as designed by Iannotti, 1978) 
during the middle of the story. The children were then asked to indicate 
how they felt, how the character in the story felt (affect attribution), 
and how they knew the protagonist felt that way (affect reasoning). 
The children were required to indicate their choice on the facial choice 
sheet by pointing, even if they verbalized the emotions to the fi rst two 
questions. The third question required a verbal response.1
Cognitive perspective-taking task. The stimulus materials 
for the cognitive perspective-taking task consisted of seven color 
drawings that depicted a story. With these cards (see Flavell et 
al., 1968, Task ID), children were told the story of a boy who was 
chased by a dog, ran away from the dog, saw an apple tree, climbed 
up the tree until the dog went away and started eating an apple. They
1 The affective match between the children’s reported affect and 
that of the story protagonist (using both the fi rst and the second questions 
that were asked; Iannotti, 1978) was also coded. Results indicated no 
signifi cant zero-order or partial correlations (controlling for both age and 
sex simultaneously) between empathic-like responses and helping in either 
of the two conditions; rs ranged from –.23 to .22, except that matching sad 
affect in the congruent picture stories was positively related to helping in the 
congruent helping condition, r = .39, p < .05, when both age and sex were 
partialed out. However, some researchers have seriously questioned whether 
picture-story-type measures are valid indicators of empathy (Eisenberg & 
Lennon, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Strayer & Schroeder, 1989).
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were asked to repeat the story back to the experimenter to ensure 
understanding. If children failed to indicate the purpose of the dog 
during his or her narration, he or she was asked why the boy climbed 
the tree and what the dog was doing in the picture that depicted the 
boy in the tree and the dog leaving (second to last picture). Next, the 
children were told that they were going to show an imagined friend 
four pictures (out of the seven) that did not show the dog chasing 
the boy up the tree. The children were asked what story they thought 
their friend would tell. If a child failed to spontaneously mention that 
the dog had chased the boy, the experimenter asked why their friend 
would think the boy climbed the tree and why their friend would 
think the dog was there. The children were assumed to be taking the 
imaginary peer’s perspective if they realized that their peer would 
not know that the dog chased the boy up the tree (as was the case in 
the longer version of the story). This measure was deemed to be an 
index of a social cognition skill that was irrelevant to helping in our 
experimental context because this task did not concern the relation 
between facial and situational affective cues.
Procedure and Helping Task
After a same-sex experimenter administered the affective 
attribution and reasoning task and the cognitive perspective-taking 
task in a counterbalanced order, the children were given an opportunity 
to help another child. Experimenters were unaware of the hypotheses 
of the study, unaware of how the social cognition measures were to 
be scored, and unaware of the condition to which the child had been 
assigned until they were presented with the helping task. Children 
were assigned (counterbalanced) to one of two helping conditions 
(see condition description below). All children were allowed to 
turn the crank attached to the wall, to show how hard it was to turn. 
The children then viewed a 4 min videotape showing a same-sex 
(male model’s age = 57 months; female model’s age = 60 months) 
confederate (Johnnie or Susie). The confederate child wore a plaster 
hand cast that reached to his or her elbow. He or she was shown 
walking to a crank with a same-sex adult. The adult then left and the 
confederate child began turning the crank (from this point on, only the 
confederate’s head, shoulders and moving arms could be seen).
All children were told that the confederate child on the TV 
was in another room at the same time and that the confederate child 
was going to turn a crank similar to the one in the subject’s room. 
The children were told that the confederate child was from another 
class just like theirs, that he or she was turning the crank to get 
some toys, and that the faster the crank was turned, the more toys 
the confederate child would receive. Children were told that if they 
turned the crank, it would make it easier for the confederate child to 
get more toys because it would make the crank turn faster (for similar 
tasks, see Liebert & Baron, 1972; Mallick & McCandless, 1966). The 
experimenter reiterated this information if necessary. The children 
were also told that they could see the confederate child on the TV but 
that the confederate could not see them. In the incongruent condition, 
the confederate in the fi lm was smiling throughout the whole tape 
even though the crank was hard to turn. In the congruent condition, the 
confederate was frowning and looked frustrated. In both conditions, 
the confederate child paused and said (30 s into the fi lm), “Boy, this 
is hard, especially with a broken hand”, after which the experimenter 
said, “I guess that is hard, with a broken hand. Anyway, I have to 
get something, I’ll be back in a couple of minutes. You can watch 
[Johnny/Susie] or you can turn the handle [the experimenter turned 
the handle a couple of times to lessen any inhibitions] or do whatever 
you want.” The experimenter left the room and returned after 90 s.
Coding Procedure
Affective attribution and reasoning task. Responses to only the 
happy and sad stories were coded because these were affectively 
relevant to the prosocial behavior. Furthermore, because the children 
seemed rarely to distinguish affective intensity in their responding, 
we collapsed their responses across the two affective levels. 
Separate scores were obtained for the congruent and incongruent 
stories. For the congruent stories, attributions were coded as I for 
reference to any sad (sad or very sad) or any happy (happy or very 
happy) affect if the attribution of how the character felt matched 
the affective cues in the story. All other responses were coded as 0. 
Scores were summed across stories depicting the same affect (two 
happy and two sad stories), producing both sad and happy attribution 
scores. The total score for sad attributions (alpha = .50) or happy 
attributions (alpha = .37) ranged from 0 to 2 (alphas of .50 or above 
are often considered adequate for 2- or 4-item scales, especially if 
the hypothesized relations are signifi cant; Nunnally, 1967).
For the incongruent stories, reconciliations were coded as 
I for any happy or any sad attribution of how the character felt 
that acknowledged the incongruent affective cues and discounted 
one of those affective cues (e.g., “He’s sad because he didn’t get 
the birthday presents that he wanted” or “She’s sad even though 
she’s smiling:’). All other responses were coded as 0. There were 
four possible reconciliation indices (using a specifi c sad or happy 
affect in combination with the facial or situational cue). However, 
because only 20% of the responses (out of 356 possible responses) 
were reconciliations and because some of the specifi c reconciliation 
indices occurred relatively infrequently, these indices were 
summed to derive a total reconciliation score (alpha = .55; total 
reconciliation scores ranged from 0 to 4). Codings of reconciliations 
were not appropriate for the congruent stories because these stories 
contained consistent facial and situational affective cues. Because 
reconciliations in the incongruent stories required that children 
indicate the story character’s emotional state, attributions were not 
coded separately for these stories.
Interrater agreement on the 22% of the cases coded by 
two independent naive judges was 100% for attributions for the 
congruent stories and 91% for reconciliations for the incongruent 
stories. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
Cognitive perspective-taking task. Responses to the cartoon 
story task were coded using an adaptation of the scoring procedures 
of Flavell et al. (1968). A score of 1 was assigned if (a) the subject 
did not spontaneously mention or indicate when probed that the dog 
played a role in the boy’s climbing the tree and (b) no fear motive 
was mentioned. All other responses were scored as 0. The correlation 
between responses coded according to this modifi ed coding scheme 
and those coded according to Flavell et al.’s (1968) original coding 
scheme was signifi cant, r(84) = .79, p < .001, two-tailed. Three 
subjects’ scores could not be computed because of diffi culty in 
hearing the videotapes. Interrater agreement was 92% on the 23% 
of the cases coded by two independent naive judges.
Helping task. In order to obtain a measure that refl ected 
qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions of helping, three 
helping indices were coded separately from the videotapes by two 
independent naive judges. The two quantitative indices were the 
number of seconds the subject turned the crank and the number of 
revolutions of the crank. The qualitative index was a 7-point rating 
(from no effort to a lot of effort) of subjects’ effort while they turned 
the crank. The interrater reliability on 22% of the cases was 100% 
agreement for the number of turns, r = .99 for time turning the handle 
and r = .81 for effort. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
Results
Affective Attributions and Reconciliations and Cognitive 
Perspective Taking
Interrelations among the scores. Sad attribution scores 
in the congruent stories were unrelated to happy attribution 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIORS AMONG CHILDREN                                                         459
scores in these stories, and both sad and happy attributions 
were unrelated to reconciliation scores in the incongruent 
stories, rs(87) = –.01 and .19, both ns. respectively.
Correlational analyses also indicated that the cartoon story 
task was signifi cantly related to sad attribution scores in the 
congruent stories, r(84) = .29, p < .01, two-tailed. However, 
this relation became nonsignifi cant when age was partialed out, 
r = .18. There were no other signifi cant relations between the 
cartoon story task and the happy attribution or the reconciliation 
measures, rs (84) = .01 and .12, ns, respectively.
Age and gender differences. To assess age and gender 
differences in the attribution scores derived from the congruent 
stories, a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (valence: happy; sad) unique 
sums-of-squares analysis of variance (ANOVA) with valence 
as a repeated factor was performed. There were signifi cant 
main effects of age,  F(1,85) = 11.81, p < .01, and valence,  
F(1,85) = 19.77, p < .001. Older children correctly reported 
sad and happy emotions combined (M = 3.83, SD = .39) more 
often than did young children (M = 3.37, SD = .73), and the 
children reported more happy (M = 1.94, SD = .23) than sad (M 
= 1.63, SD = .59) emotions. There also was a signifi cant Age × 
Valence interaction,  F(1, 85) = 10.85, p < .01. Tests of simple 
effects indicated that older children reported sad emotions 
more often than did young children,  F(1,85) = 18.59, p < .001 
(for older children, M = 1.88, SD = .33; for young children, M 
= 1.43, SD = .68), whereas there were no age differences for 
happy attributions. No other effects were signifi cant.
To assess age and gender differences in the reconciliation 
scores derived from the incongruent stories, we performed an 
additional 2 (age) × 2 (sex) unique sums-of-squares ANOVA. 
There were no signifi cant effects, even though the older 
children did reconcile the incongruent cues somewhat more 
often than did the young children (for older children, M = 
2.13, SD = 1.11; for young children, M = 1.84, SD = 1.21). 
Similarly, a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) unique sums-of-squares ANOVA 
was performed to assess age and gender differences on the 
cartoon story task. There was a signifi cant main effect for age 
(for young children, M = .09, SD = .29; for older children, M 
= .40, SD = .50),  F(1, 82) = 11.99, p < .001, and a signifi cant 
main effect for gender (for boys, M= .13, SD = .33; for girls, 
M= .37, SD = .49),  F(1, 82) = 6.33, p < .01. Older children 
and girls scored higher on this type of social cognition.
Helping Measure
We performed a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (helping condition) 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to assess the 
effects of age, sex, and helping condition on the number of 
turns, time turning, and effort indices. There was a signifi cant 
multivariate main effect of age,  F(2, 80) = 3.11, p < .05 (for 
older children, Ms = 25.78, 8.80, and 4.15, SDs = 30.25, 10.57, 
and 2.44; for young children, Ms = 37.27, 8.67, and 4.59, SDs 
= 33.37, 10.13, and 2.48, for time turning, number of turns, 
and effort, respectively). However, the univariate analyses 
were not signifi cant. There were no other signifi cant effects.
Relations Between Helping and the Affective Attribution, 
Reconciliation. and Cognitive Perspective-Taking Scores
The zero-order relations and the partial correlations 
(controlling for both sex and age) between helping and the 
attribution and reconciliation measures are presented in Table 
1 (we computed one-tailed signifi cance tests for the signifi cant 
correlations because these relations were hypothesized a 
priori). To reduce the total number of possible correlations 
while still examining the hypothesized relations, we formed 
a composite index of helping. The composite was the sum 
of the standardized number of turns and the standardized 
number of seconds turning (r = .80, p < .001, between these 
two indices) multiplied by the effort score. Conceptually, this 
index weighed the amount of helping by the amount of effort 
expended in helping.2
As can be seen in Table 1, the pattern of correlations 
was consistent with the hypotheses. Sad attributions in the 
congruent stories were positively related to helping in the 
congruent condition, and reconciliations were positively 
related to helping in the incongruent condition. There 
were no signifi cant relations between congruent attribution 
measures and helping in the incongruent condition, nor were 
there signifi cant relations between reconciliations for the 
incongruent stories and helping in the congruent condition. 
Furthermore, the correlations between the sad attribution 
measure and helping in the congruent versus the incongruent 
conditions were signifi cantly different, Z = 2.10, p < .05, 
one-tailed; the correlations between the reconciliation 
measure and helping in the congruent versus the incongruent 
conditions were marginally different, Z = 1.55, p < .06, one-
tailed. Finally, the cartoon story task was unrelated to helping 
in the congruent and the incongruent conditions, rs = -.17 and 
.10, both ns. respectively.
Because we were concerned about violations of the 
normal distribution assumptions, we conducted analyses using 
arcsine transformations of the affective and the cognitive 
perspective-taking scores and reciprocal transformations 
of the helping measure; these analyses produced the same 
results. Also, the correlation between helping and the cartoon 
story task using the original coding scheme of Flavell et al. 
(1968) was nonsignifi cant.3
Discussion
In general, our fi ndings supported the hypothesis that 
measures of social cognition are related to helping scores 
primarily when helping would be expected to be facilitated 
by the specifi c form of social cognition (Eisenberg, 1986; 
Kurdek, 1978). Specifi cally, children who made sad 
attributions in the congruent stories helped more in the 
congruent helping condition than did children who did not 
make sad attributions. In contrast, children who reconciled 
the confl icting cues in the incongruent stories helped more in 
the incongruent helping condition. As expected, scores on the 
2 A 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (helping condition) ANOVA on the helping 
composite revealed no signifi cant effects.
3 The relations between the social cognition measures and number of 
seconds turning, number of turns, and effort (as separate indices of helping) 
were also examined. In the congruent condition, sad attributions were 
signifi cantly (p < .05), positively related to number of turns, r = .25, and 
to both number of turns and number of seconds turning when both age and 
sex were partialed out, rs = .39 and .32, respectively. In the incongruent 
condition, reconciliations were signifi cantly, positively related to each 
helping index even when age and sex were both partialed out; rs ranged 
from .27 to .35.
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measures derived from the congruent stories were not 
related to helping in the incongruent helping condition, 
and measures derived from the incongruent stories were 
not related to helping in the congruent helping condition. 
In addition, as expected, attributions and reasoning about 
affect were positively related to helping that required 
assessment of another’s emotional state, whereas a cognitive 
perspective-taking task that did not focus on affective cues 
was unrelated to helping that required processing of affective 
cues (Denham, 1986; Eisenberg, 1986; Kurdek, 1978).
The present fi ndings also suggest that there may be 
other cognitive abilities related to helping in addition to 
perspective taking. That is, the ability to reconcile confl icting 
affective cues, a cognitive ability beyond identifying the 
cues, was positively related to helping when the helping 
context included incongruent cues. This fi nding is consistent 
with other evidence of the importance of cognitive abilities 
other than perspective taking in social behaviors (e.g., Brady, 
Newcomb, & Hartup, 1983; Chao, Knight, & Dubro, 1986; 
Knight, Berning, Wilson, & Chao, 1987; Knight, Bohlmeyer, 
Schneider, & Harris, 1990). Past inconsistencies in the 
observed empirical relations between perspective taking and 
prosocial behaviors may be partially the result of variability in 
these additional cognitive prerequisites. For example, in some 
studies, a mismatch between the cognitive demands inherent 
in a prosocial behavior measure and those in a perspective-
taking measure may have resulted in underestimates of the 
expected pattern of the relation between these underlying 
constructs. Thus, it may be necessary to consider a range of 
potential cognitive prerequisites when hypothesizing about 
the role of cognitive development in prosocial behaviors.
Future investigations using the present approach are 
needed to validate the present fi ndings in naturalistic settings. 
Furthermore, consideration of the relations of different 
sociocognitive abilities to prosocial behaviors (e.g., moral 
reasoning), abilities that have been hypothesized to relate 
signifi cantly to helping, may be enhanced from using the 
present approach. For example, specifi c forms of moral 
reasoning (e.g., sympathetic-type reasoning, that is, reasoning 
pertaining to feeling concerned for another) may be positively 
associated with helping in situations that specifi cally require 
reasoning about affect (Eisenberg, 1986). Nevertheless, the 
fi ndings of this study support the assertion that specifi c forms 
of helping require specifi c forms of social cognition.
In addition to matching cognitive demands, it also is 
necessary to consider motivational processes in explaining 
individual differences in helping (Eisenberg, 1986; Knight et 
al., 1987). That is, although a child may have the cognitive 
abilities underlying both a given social cognition measure 
and a helping measure, the child may not be motivated to use 
that cognitive skill in the helping situation; or, having used 
that cognitive skill in the helping situation and knowing that 
another is in need of help, the child may elect not to help. This 
motivational gap between knowledge and behavior no doubt 
accounts, in part, for the fact that sociocognitive abilities are 
at best only moderately associated with prosocial behavior. 
Nonetheless, sociocognitive skills, such as attributions and 
reasoning about affect, may frequently be a prerequisite for 
prosocial actions based on moral principles or empathy-based 
emotional responding (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1984; 
Underwood & Moore, 1982) and are therefore important for 
an understanding of altruistic behaviors.
The magnitude of the relations observed in this study may 
also have been attenuated by the reliability of the measures. 
As has been the case in previous research, the social cognition 
measures used in this study included few items. However, the 
reliabilities of two of the key social cognition measures (the 
sad attribution and the reconciliation measures) were quite 
adequate for 2- and 4-item scales. Furthermore, the consistent 
pattern of relations between social cognitions and helping 
suggests some reliability and construct validity. In previous 
studies, researchers have attempted to increase the reliability 
of indices of social cognition by aggregating several indices 
(Denham, 1986; Iannotti, 1985). However, the results of this 
study suggest that such an approach increases the magnitude 
and consistency of relations between social cognition 
measures and social behavior primarily when there is a match 
between the specifi c cognitive requirements of the multiple 
sociocognitive measures and the social behavior measures.
There were a few interesting age differences in 
responses to the affective attribution and helping measures. 
The age differences in affective attributions were consistent 
with previous evidence that young children avoid sad cues 
and prefer to report happy emotions and that older children 
explain affect more than do young children (Glasberg & 
Aboud, 1982; Gnepp, 1983; Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989; 
Iannotti, 1978; Kurdek & Rogdon, 1975; Saarni, 1979). 
However, the age differences in helping in this study were 
very weak, perhaps because of the narrow age range sampled. 
It is possible that age differences in affective attributions and 
reasoning could account for age differences in helping (e.g., 
Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983) in a wider 
age-range sample if the specifi c form of helping required 
these cognitive processes.
References
Brady, J. E., Newcomb, A. E, & Hartup, W. W. (1983). Context 
and companion’s behavior as determinant’s of cooperation 
and competition in school-age children. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 36, 396–412.
Table I
Relations and Partial Correlations Between Helping and Attributions 
and Reconciliations
                                               Congruent helping         Incongruent
                                                         (n = 44)              helping (n = 45)
Sociocognitive
   measures                                 r             Partial rs            r      Partial rs
Sad attributions  .28*  .45**  –.17  –.20
Happy attributions  .11  .11  .14  .11
Reconciliations  .01  .04  .34**  .31*
Note. Attributions were coded from the congruent stories, and 
reconciliations were coded from the incongruent stories. Partial 
correlations (partial rs) were controlled for both sex and age.
* p < .05, one-tailed.    ** p < .01, one-tailed.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIORS AMONG CHILDREN                                                         461
Chao, C.-C., Knight, G. P., & Dubro, A. E. (1986). Information 
processing and age differences in social decision-making. 
Developmental Psychology, 22, 500–508.
Denham, S. (1986). Social cognition, prosocial behavior, and 
emotion in preschoolers: Contextual validation. Child 
Development, 57, 194–201.
Eisenberg, N. (1986). Altruistic emotion, cognition and behavior. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eisenberg, N., & Lennon, R. (1983). Sex differences in empathy 
and related capacities. Psychological Bulletin, 94, 100–
131.
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. (1987). The relation of empathy to 
prosocial and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 
101, 91–119.
Flavell, J. H., Botkin, P., Fry, C., Wright, J., & Jarvis, P. (1968). 
The development of role-taking and communication skills in 
children. New York: Wiley.
Glasberg, R., & Aboud, E. (1982). Keeping one’s distance from 
sadness: Children’s self-reports of emotional experience. 
Developmental Psychology, 18, 287–293.
Gnepp, J. (1983). Children’s social sensitivity: Inferring 
emotions from confl icting cues. Developmental Psychology, 
19, 805–814.
Gnepp, J., McKee, E., & Domanic, J. A. (1987). Children’s 
understanding of situational information to infer emotion: 
Understanding emotionally equivocal situations. 
Developmental Psychology, 23, 114–123.
Hoffman, M. L. (1984). Empathy, its limitations, and its role 
in a comprehensive moral theory. In W.  M. Kurtines & 
J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral 
development (pp. 283–302). New York: Wiley.
Hoffner, C., & Badzinski, D. M. (1989). Children’s integration of 
facial and situational cues to emotion. Child Development, 
60, 411–422.
Iannotti, R. J. (1978). Effect of role-taking experiences on role 
taking, empathy, altruism, and aggression. Developmental 
Psychology, 14, 119–124.
Iannotti, R. J. (1985). Naturalistic and structured assessments of 
prosocial behavior in preschool children: The infl uence of 
empathy and perspective taking. Developmental Psychology, 
21, 46–55.
Knight, G. P., Berning, A. L., Wilson, S. L., & Chao, C.-C. 
(1987). The effects of information-processing demands and 
social-situational factors on the social decision making of 
children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 43, 
244–259.
Knight, G. P., Bohlmeyer, E. M., Schneider, H., & Harris, J. D. 
(1990). Age differences in sharing as a function of task-
specifi c cognitive prerequisites: Time estimation ability 
and a fi xed-duration sharing task. Unpublished manuscript, 
Arizona State University, Tempe.
Kurdek, L. A. (1978). Perspective-taking as the cognitive basis 
of children’s moral development: A review of the literature. 
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 24, 3–28.
Kurdek, L. A., & Rogdon, M. M. (1975). Perceptual, cognitive, 
and affective perspective taking in kindergarten through 
sixth-grade children. Developmental Psychology, 11, 643–
650.
Liebert, R. M., & Baron, R. A. (1972). Some immediate effects 
of televised violence on children’s behavior. Developmental 
Psychology, 6, 469–475.
Mallick, S. K., & McCandless, B. R. (1966). A study of catharsis 
of aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
4, 591–596.
Nunnally, J. C. (1967). Psychometric theory. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Radke-Yarrow, M., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Chapman, M. (1983). 
Prosocial dispositions and behavior. In P. Mussen (Series 
Ed.) & E. M. Hetherington (Vol. Ed.), Manual of child 
psychology: Vol. 4. Socialization, personality, and social 
development (pp. 469–545). New York: Wiley.
Reichenbach, L., & Masters, J. C. (1983). Children’s use of 
expressive and contextual cues in judgments of emotion. 
Child Development, 54, 993–1004.
Saarni, C. (1979). Children’s understanding of display rules for 
expressive behavior. Developmental Psychology, 15, 424–
429.
Shantz, C. U. (1975). The development of social cognition. In 
E. M. Hetherington (Ed.), Review of child development 
research (Vol. 5, pp. 257–323). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Strayer, J., & Schroeder, M. (1989). Children’s helping strategies: 
Infl uences of emotion, empathy, and age. In N. Eisenberg 
(Ed.), New directions for child development: Empathy and 
related emotional responses (pp. 85–105). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.
Underwood, B., & Moore, B. (1982). Perspective-taking and 
altruism. Psychological Bulletin, 91,143–173.
Submitted March 1990; 
Revised May 1990; 
Accepted June 1990.
